



# MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ANNUAL REPORT

2021







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## FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

*Dear Readers,*

*The recent turbulent events in the international security environment, the COVID-19 pandemic, military aggression of Russia against Ukraine and the vast amount of disinformation naturally brings uncertainty to human thinking. In such a situation, it is necessary to provide unbiased, objective information that will clarify the context of the events and also enable eligible recipients to take the right actions to ensure the security of the Slovak Republic.*



*The main mission of the Military Intelligence is to gather information relevant for the defence of the Slovak Republic, analyse it and assess the level of threat to the country and society. The current dynamics of the security threats causes that our society is shifting from one crisis to another. Some authoritarian states exploited this vulnerability as a pretext to restrain democracy and to influence public opinion in the Slovak Republic. They are using methods of hybrid influence, mass spread of disinformation, and espionage activities. Recent events indicate that the effort of the Military Intelligence to expose and counter these hostile activities of foreign actors is highly professional and effective.*

*In 2021, the Military Intelligence provided many qualified intelligence reports and assessments required for important decisions at government level. The Military Intelligence is not alone in addressing security challenges. We cooperate with a broad spectrum of national and international partners on a daily basis. The Military Intelligence is aware that a modern intelligence service cannot be locked into itself, so we strive to be more open to the public and the security community to explain our mission and our activities.*

*2021 was a difficult year that brought many challenges to our lives, so let me express my sincere gratitude to all members of the Military Intelligence for their professional conduct in fulfilling the tasks imposed on them by law and for their exceptional work while ensuring security of the Slovak Republic.*

*Brigadier General Ing. Róbert KLEŠTINEC  
Director of the Military Intelligence*



## INTRODUCTION

Within the scope of its responsibilities, the Military Intelligence (hereafter as the “MI”) collects, processes and evaluates information vital for ensuring the defence and defence capabilities of the Slovak Republic (hereafter as the “SR”). The present Annual Report on the activities of the MI for 2021 reflects changes in the internal and external security environment in 2021.

The COVID-19 pandemic remained a major factor with an impact on the development in the internal and external security environment in 2021. Despite these difficult conditions, the MI fulfilled its mission of intelligence provision for the purpose of ensuring the national defence within the scope of the Ministry of Defence (hereafter as the “MoD”) of the SR, as stipulated in Act No. 198/1994 on Military Intelligence and in accordance with the MI’s Intelligence Effort for 2021.

The MI carried out its tasks based on the broad spectrum of identified and anticipated security threats, which act or may act against protected values and interests of the SR in the internal and external security environment, including cyberspace.

In geographic terms, the sources of threats were identified within the internal security environment of the SR, and in the region of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Ukraine, the Western Balkans, Middle East and North Africa.

In the internal security environment, the threats in the information space and cyberspace were growing continuously, together with the number of actors and intensity of both cyber-attacks and influence operations. The MI detected a trend to exploit malign cyber-attacks as part of complex influence operations aimed to weaken the integrity of state institutions and polarise the society of the SR. Individuals, groups or foreign actors continued to abuse or undermine anti-pandemic measures adopted at state level in order to deepen distrust in state

institutions and to draw dividing lines within the society.

In 2021, the MI paid intensive attention to the abovementioned security threats, evaluated their negative impact on the protected values and their effect on the security environment of the SR. The MI provided information on these threats and their possible ramifications to authorised users in order to support their decision-making process.

The current security architecture of Europe, heretofore defined by existing international and bilateral agreements and commitments on the international arms control and disarmament framework, is continuously eroding. The withdrawal of key global actors from the arms control and disarmament agreements led to a further decline in confidence in international institutions. The system, once regarded as one of the basic pillars of global security, stability and trust in the international relations, can now be considered as restricted or even non-functional.

The most significant event of 2021 in the external security environment, was the build-up of conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which escalated into a full-fledged Russian military campaign in Ukraine in February 2022.

There were also other events with a negative impact on the external security environment of the SR, such as the sudden change in power in Afghanistan and the migration crisis on the border of Belarus with Poland.

On March 23, 2022, the MI submitted a detailed description of its activities in 2021 as part of the classified “Report on the Activities of the MI for 2021” to the members of the Military Intelligence Oversight Committee (hereafter as “Committee”) of the National Council of the SR and the Committee took note of the report. Subsequently, on June 21, 2022, the MI presented its “Report on the fulfilling of tasks of the MI in 2021” to the national deputies of the Slovak parliament.

## FULFILLMENT OF THE TASKS STIPULATED BY LAW

In 2021, the MI fulfilled the tasks of intelligence provision for the purposes of ensuring national defence by providing intelligence within the scope of the MoD of the SR as stipulated in the Act No. 198/1994 Coll. on MI.

The MI performed its statutory tasks taking into account the full spectrum of identified and anticipated security threats that act or may act against the protected values and interests of the SR in the internal and external security environment, including cyberspace.

### ENSURING NATIONAL DEFENCE AND MILITARY-ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THE SR

In the area of defence capabilities of the SR, the MI focused on obtaining and evaluating information related to the construction of modern and interoperable, well-armed and trained Armed Forces of the SR (hereafter as the “AF SR”) capable of defending the territory of the SR, deployable within the framework of national and international crisis management and at the same time fulfilling our commitments to NATO and EU.

Within the MoD of the SR, the MI participated in the preparation of key strategic documents, the Security Strategy of the SR and the Defence Strategy of the SR. Simultaneously, the MI evaluated the implementation process of military doctrines, planning, evaluation and implementation documents of the MoD of the SR and the General Staff (hereafter as the “GS”) which determine the objectives and resource frameworks for continuous provision of capability development and increase of operational readiness of the AF SR with regard to requirements and international obligations of the SR. In the evaluated period, the MI participated also in the preparation process of the Military Strategy.

The achieved level of training of the AF SR is one of the key factors in determining the defence capabilities of the SR. The MI evaluated the mentioned area with a focus on the preparedness level of the AF SR units to perform national defence tasks as well as on the scope and quality of the task performed during national and international exercises. The quality and level of training of the AF SR have long been negatively


affected by a lack of trained personnel and the technical condition of the main types of armaments and combat equipment. The long-term declining trend in the operability of the military equipment is caused by overall obsolescence, insufficient supply of spare parts and uncoordinated and unsystematic provision of repairs by contractors. Progress in capabilities of the AF SR has been achieved in the area of indirect fire support with the introduction of the new Zuzana 2 self-propelled howitzer. This capability building process will be continued with the introduction of automatic fire control systems.

Defence Strategy of the SR – reflects the changing security environment, the national security status and the findings from both the implementation of the defence policy of the SR and the development of the state defence system. It formulates the baselines of the defence policy, its goals, methods and tools for their fulfilment.

Military Strategy – defines basic factors which shape the operational environment of the AF SR and specify the framework for creating scenarios of a possible armed conflict.

In 2021, significant progress has been achieved in the staffing area. More than 4,000 persons showed interest to serve in the AF SR. 629 professional soldiers joined the AF SR, while 568 professional soldiers requested to be released from active duty. The most requests to leave the AF SR were recorded among soldiers in the physical age of 40-49. Captains and majors are the most frequent ranks leaving the AF SR in the





In 2021, in relation to the fulfilment of the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System-NATINAMDS, the MI dedicated its intelligence focus on evaluating activities of the Russian technical staff stationed at the Tactical Wing SLIAČ, which provided long term service work of the MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter aircrafts. The presence of the Russian technical personnel at the Tactical Wing and their access to sensitive information concerning Slovak Air Force capabilities posed a potential threat to the national defence of the SR in the case of its exploitation by Russian intelligence services.

involving the growing influence of information spread through social media on members of the AF SR. In this context, the MI noticed the spread of harmful propaganda and calls for state power change in the SR, which were aimed to mobilize the civilian population for protest activities against the government of the SR. Efforts to influence members of the security forces (hereafter as the “SF”), including the AF SR, through harmful propaganda and the spread of disinformation have also continued. In 2021, both growing radicalisation and deepening polarisation of society, including the AF SR, were observed. The spread of disinformation linked to the anti-pandemic measures taken by the Government of the SR was one of the main driving forces of the deepening social polarisation.

### Fulfilment of tasks of the AF SR within the domestic crisis management framework

In 2021, the AF SR continued to fulfil tasks within the domestic crisis management framework in tackling the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic with their participation in operations JOINT WALL, JOINED WALL II, CONTINUITY and IMMUNITY. The performance of assistance tasks in favour of the Ministry of the Interior of the SR and the Ministry of Health of the SR was negatively affected by persisting legislative limits and limited human and material resources restricting the tasks fulfilment options. For example, a limiting number of military personnel that had been dedicated to participate in the fulfilment of several tasks simultaneously. The allocation of military equipment and personnel for assistance tasks significantly reduced options of the AF SR both to respond should other crisis situations arise and to perform stipulated tasks of the training year.



In the evaluated period, the MI noticed a continued trend concerning the involvement of actors belonging to the so-called anti-system spectrum spreading of conspiracy theories and disinformation as well as a negative trend

## Ensuring military-economic interests of the SR

In 2021, the MI continued to fulfil tasks of ensuring military-economic interests of the SR and preventing potential lack of transparency and efficiency within the state-owned MoD-administered property procurement and management. The attention was focused mainly on preparation and implementation phases of projects aimed to develop new capabilities and replace some of the obsolete armament of the AF SR.

A considerable part of the AF SR armament has significantly exceeded recommended service life. Any major repairs or large-scale modernisation can be rather seen as only partial and excessively long. In case of Russian originated armament, any potential maintenance-related processes have been affected by constraints resulting from geopolitical changes.

Concerning modernisation projects, the MI focused mainly on their overall efficiency when compared to the actual increase in the capabilities of the AF SR. In 2021, most of the MoD activities were aimed at the procurement of wheeled 8x8 platform armoured vehicles and tracked infantry fighting vehicles intended to replace the outdated BVP-1 and BVP-2 infantry fighting vehicles and their modifications in the armament of the AF SR. In November 2021, the Zuzana II self-propelled howitzer was officially introduced into the armament of the AF SR and the first nine pieces have been deployed to the NATO Operation Enhanced Forward Presence operation in Latvia as part of the AF SR contribution.

Within the air force of the AF SR, attention was paid to measures aimed to resolve the ongoing process of infrastructure modernisation at the Sliač airport in order to be fully prepared to accommodate procured F-16 fighter jets.

Continuing the transition process of rotary-wing aviation to new equipment, the procurement of two additional UH-60M utility helicopters was approved by the Slovak Government in June 2021 with armament for the purposes of the Special operation forces of the AF SR. The acquisition was cofounded by the government of the United States of America. The contract also includes the planned retrofitting of nine previously acquired UH-60M helicopters with appropriate armament.

In March 2021, an agreement between the MoD of the SR and the Israeli ELTA Systems company was reached to provide the AF SR with 17 radars in total amounting to EUR 148.2 million. In addition to allocating the necessary funds, the radar equipment replacement will require also adequate staffing.



The MI also paid attention to activities of state-owned companies where the MoD executes sole shareholders rights. The focus was pointed mainly at their ability to achieve financial stability. In 2021, the MoD showed significant interest in supporting domestic defence industry companies, mainly by their active involvement within upcoming acquisition projects.

## DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE NEAR ABROAD OF THE SR

### Russian Federation

In geopolitical terms, Russia has posed the most serious military security challenge for both the SR and the interests of EU and NATO member states. One of the main tasks of the MI in 2021 was to monitor and assess Russia's activities. Russia continued to assertively and increasingly pursue its strategic interest, including efforts to disrupt the internal cohesion of EU and NATO and their member states, thereby increasing international tension and polarisation in the relations between Russia and the so-called West.



Russia has defined military power including nuclear deterrence as one of the most important instruments for achieving strategic objectives and has actively continued a wide-ranging build up, sustainment and employment of its military capabilities.

In terms of security of the SR, the deployment and activities of the Russian Armed Forces (hereafter as the "AF RUS") in proximity to the border of Ukraine and on the Crimean peninsula from March to May and at the end of 2021 were perceived as a growing immediate threat. Observed activities of the AF RUS from March to May were highly likely focused on exercising offensive actions despite their declared defensive nature. The combat power of the AF RUS once again accumulated in the region at the end of

2021 was sufficient for the commencement of a military campaign against Ukraine.

The Russian domestic political scene has been marked by increased efforts and coordinated pressure applied against opposition by the state power and its apparatus. Within the social environment, a so-called militarisation of the awareness among the population alongside with an identification of threats to Russia stemming from the United States, EU and NATO continued. The disseminated propaganda highly likely aimed to rally public support for a military campaign on Ukrainian territory.

Russia actively utilised the AF RUS and Russian Private Military Companies to sustain and pursue its political and strategical objectives in the near abroad, Middle East, Africa, and the Arctic, while the AF RUS further developed their bilateral and multilateral cooperation with partner countries.

The serial production start of new-generation combat equipment has been set for 2020, according to the Russian State Armament Plan. It is, however, highly likely that only a small part of outdated types of equipment of the AF RUS will be in the mid-term replaced by new types of equipment developed by the Russian Military-Industrial Complex (hereafter as the "MIC"). While modernisation of combat equipment already in use has been ongoing, real combat parameters are often far below the parameters of new types of equipment and do not correspond to the funds allocated for their modernisation. Moreover, the firepower of modernised weapons has been limited by the use of outdated types of ammunitions which make up the majority of the AF RUS stockpiles.

## Republic of Belarus

In 2021, Belarus has been the source of a direct hybrid threat to EU and the SR by organising and supporting illegal migration to EU member states. The Belarussian regime continued a wide-ranging repressive consolidation of its power by restricting political opposition and media activities. The aggravation of external relations between Belarus and states of the so called West has been recorded, resulting in increased international isolation of Belarus. On the other hand, Belarus has brought its

relationship with its strategic ally, Russia, to a qualitatively higher level, particularly in the military area.

The Belarussian MIC economic problems continued to negatively affect the performance of its companies. In 2021, the MIC has remained considerably export oriented. The majority of its production was intended for export, especially to Russia, however, its share of exports has been declining for a long time.

## Ukraine

Ukraine did not pose a threat to the SR or NATO. In 2021, NATO and EU membership continued to be declared strategic objectives of Ukraine. Both the internal and external security environment of Ukraine was marked by an escalation in tensions. The ongoing conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine, internal political situation and wide-ranging build-up in Russian pressure directed against the executive authority and citizens of Ukraine were the principal factors with a negative impact. The security situation in the conflict zone in eastern part of Ukraine has been serious. The conflicting parties have gradually stopped to adhere to the ceasefire agreement that took effect on July 27, 2020. The political and diplomatic intention of Ukraine to resolve the reintegration process of the occupied regions has not been fulfilled. While Russia began with the economic integration of the separatist republics during the assessed period.

Russia has made intensive efforts to destabilize the internal political situation in Ukraine using political, economic and military tools. The mentioned factors had a negative impact on the living standards of Ukrainian citizens, but the protest potential remained low.

The Ukrainian president Volodymyr ZELENSKYI was the most crucial actor on Ukrainian political-strategic level. He adopted several political and personal changes to eliminate Russia's influence on internal matters of Ukraine and to increase efficiency of the Ukrainian defence sector. His most important acts included declaring the security sector reform process, aligning activities between the Chief of Defence and the Minister of Defence, ensuring sufficient power of the president and his office on matters concerning national security, and adoption of legislative changes.

In 2021, the Ukrainian MIC was characterised by stagnation and in some areas even by a decrease in production with a significant negative impact on the fulfilment of the State Defence Order for 2021. The MIC faced financial difficulties and several of its companies were on the edge of bankruptcy. This situation had a negative impact on the development of new weapon systems and caused problems with meeting delivery deadlines of domestic and international contracts.



## ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

In the area of protection against the activities of foreign intelligence and security services (hereafter as the “FISS”), the effort of the MI in 2021 was focused on the detection, intelligence monitoring, analysis and elimination of FISS operations against the protected values and interests of the SR. The MI also collected information about the activities of hostile FISS in countries, where development of the security situation may also affect negatively the interests of the SR.

The FISS used the territory of the SR also for conducting so-called cross-border intelligence operations, i.e. execution of various phases of intelligence operations by the intelligence services of foreign powers in several countries. In this context, the MI cooperated with partner services of NATO and EU member states and conducted intelligence operations in order to hinder or eliminate the FISS hostile activities.

## Russian Federation

The MI, within its scope, has been monitoring the intelligence activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the AF RUS (former GRU, hereafter as the "GU GS"). In the SR, the GU GS operates mainly through intelligence officers legalised in diplomatic positions and has repeatedly exploited the geographic position of the SR also for cross-border intelligence operations. In 2021, the SR expelled three Russian intelligence officers working in the SR under diplomatic cover in response to the exposure of GU GS involvement in the explosions at two arms depots in Vrbětice.

Activities of the GU GS on the territory of the SR has been focused on obtaining access to sensitive and classified information on the defence capabilities of the SR, political processes on regional and national level, information on the AF SR Command structure and decision-making processes at the MoD level, as well as classified documents submitted to the Security Council of

the SR and the National Council of the SR and any information related to NATO and the EU. The use of traditional recruitment methods aimed at active duty personnel and former members of the AF SR, as well as persons with ties to the MoD and regional and top politics of the SR, continued. Financial rewards and sympathy towards Russia remained the main motivational tools for establishing cooperation. In 2021, the MI conducted several successful operations resulting into the detection of Russian intelligence activities in the SR. Based on the measures taken, more Russian intelligence services members have been expelled in 2022 and the overall number of Russian diplomats in the SR has been reduced significantly.



In 2021, the MI conducted also a successful intelligence operation aimed to dismantle a Russian international scientific and technical spy network. As part of this operation, the MI identified a Slovak company (and a citizen of the SR), which was used by Russian intelligence services as a cover for the purchase of advanced technologies intended for the Russian aerospace program.

At the same time, there is a long-term upwards trend of Russian hybrid activities in the SR. These activities are conducted through a wide range of tools from diplomacy to FISS, as well as through strategic propaganda aimed at negatively

influencing public opinion, top state officials and state institutions of the SR, including the MoD and the AF SR. Within the framework of hybrid activities, Russia exploited domestic political events in the SR and the polarization of society to promote and spread pro-Russian strategic propaganda narratives in order to weaken confidence in the state and state institutions.

The MI also obtained information and evaluated abroad activities of Russian intelligence services in order to disclose Russian foreign policy interests and influence in selected regions. Russia has deepened intelligence cooperation with its traditional partners and increased the intensity of its intelligence activities in some African countries.

### **People's Republic of China**

Findings obtained in the evaluated period confirmed changes in activities of Chinese intelligence services in the territory of the SR. In previous years, their activities were concentrated mainly in the economic, political, academic and technological fields. In general, this approach was in line with the concept of applying the so-called soft power in promoting geopolitical interests of China.

In 2021, Chinese intelligence officers in the SR have increased their efforts to gain contacts and to increase the number of meetings with top defence sector officials. Moreover, the MI noticed attempts to establish and subsequently deepen contacts with the AF SR members during their deployment abroad.

## ASYMMETRIC THREATS AGAINST PROTECTED VALUES OF THE SR, NATO AND THE EU

### **Terrorism, financing and support of terrorism**

The MI continuously collects and analyses information regarding possible terrorist threats, financing and support of terrorism within the territory of the SR, including possible radicalisation of members of the AF SR, activities of militant and terrorist groups as well as activities of radicalised individuals within member states of the EU and NATO. The early identification of so-called lone-wolves or autonomous terrorist cells remains particularly important.

During 2021, no indicators of an actual or imminent terrorist threat in the form of planning or conducting a terrorist attack in the SR have been recorded.

Activities of radicalised individuals influenced by Islamist propaganda aimed at inciting low-cost terrorist attacks and the spread of radical Islamist ideology as such continued to pose a threat to the internal security environment of the SR. In the assessed period, the MI did not detect any

performed screening checks of several Afghan evacuees as well as of persons involved in the proposal process regarding the transfer of Afghan evacuees to the SR.

#### **Slovak Muslim Community**

The Slovak Muslim community continues to be regarded as moderate and rather fragmented. Their activities have had no impact on ensuring national security or defence of the SR. No close affiliation of members of the AF SR to the Slovak Muslim community has been recorded.

Relevant activities of individual Muslim communities and places of worship have mostly been affected by ongoing anti-pandemic measures, a critical situation with regards to the presence of religious authorities and an essential underfunding, resulting into a significantly reduced occurrence of larger events and community life itself. Religious activities have partially shifted to online space, where discussions and Islam lectures usually took place within closed groups.

Within the assessed period, the MI also collected information concerning certain individuals with links to individual Slovak Muslim communities based on the principle of belonging to a certain nationality or ethnic group and their involvement in pseudo-legal migration, money laundering and other forms of economic crime. The observed scheme involved the establishment of different companies or cultural societies used to hide illegal activities and attempts to exploit cooperation with Slovak citizens with some level of influence inside national bodies and authorities to facilitate pseudo-legal migration.



indications suggesting an inclination towards a radical interpretation of Islam among members of the AF SR or defence sector employees.

The takeover of power in Afghanistan by the Taliban Islamist movement has had, among others, an energizing effect on the Salafist and Salafist-Jihadist scene and the proliferation of radical propaganda exploiting the narrative of a great victory over the so-called West. The MI

## **Right-wing terrorism threat in the SR**

Besides religiously motivated terrorism, right-wing terrorism (hereafter as “RWT”) has posed a threat to the EU during 2021. Individual cases of persons inclined to right-wing extremism (hereafter as “RWE”) ideologies have been recorded within the defence sector, however, none of the observed cases qualified legally or qualitatively as RWT.

The domestic RWE community, for the time being interlinked mainly via online platforms and social networks, has also been intertwined with the Slovak anti-system scene. Most of their adherents subscribe to ideas of the so-called accelerationism, meaning they are making preparations for the so-called “Day X”, a day when the system is about to collapse and which they claim should be used to take over power and establish a new world order. They openly support attacks against coalition politicians as well as against racial, ethnic, religious and sexual minorities.

In one instance, the National Criminal Agency (hereafter as the “NAKA”) of the Presidium of the Police Force (hereafter as the “PF”) launched an investigation against a group of persons accused of sending an anonymous letter threatening attacks on buildings housing the Slovak Government, Head of State, Slovak Information Service as well as the AF SR and PF of the SR. Among the suspects is also a member of the AF SR accused of membership in a group planning to overthrow the state.

The MI also obtained relevant information concerning the interest of foreign nationals to purchase illegal weapons and acquire shooting skills in the SR. The MI continues to pay special attention to this phenomenon, especially given the fact that in the past perpetrators of previous terrorist attacks elsewhere in the world had already taken part in shooting training courses officially organised by Slovak companies or had tried to purchase ammunition in the SR before conducting terrorist acts. Among foreign nationals, the SR is sought for and considered attractive not only because of certain financial or legislative aspects, but also with the aim to evade

attention of security and intelligence services in their home states.

## **Threats associated with the financing and support of terrorism linked to the SR**

The MI obtained relevant information about the activities of an individual with dual Indian and British citizenship within the territory of the SR. His past activities involved the purportedly establishment of companies providing air transport services in different European states, while the flights had been exploited for the transfer of weapons, goods and persons into risk countries and conflict zones, which gave grounds for suspecting illicit activities in the form of providing logistical support to terrorism. Based on information obtained by the MI, this person is currently suspected of indirectly managing, through intermediaries, an airline in the SR. His activities are likely profit-oriented, without displaying signs of any specific ideological affiliation, as had also been demonstrated with deliveries to both conflicting sides in Libya. In April 2021, the airline had intended to borrow USD 500,000 from an undisclosed foreign company. The relevant information has been transmitted to the Slovak Ministry of Transport and Construction for taking further action.

The MI obtained information concerning certain Libyan citizens holding positions in the Libyan interim government with an interest in acquiring diplomatic posts in the SR or influencing the appointment process to these positions. Direct links of some of these persons to the SR were identified, as were past accusations of mismanagement of public funds in Libya and of supporting Islamists militias and terrorist groups.

Two instances of smuggling of mercury compound from Ukraine to the SR were recorded. Given the very high toxicity of compounds of mercury, they could have been exploited for the execution of chemical terrorist attacks, including RWT.



## **Terrorism threat in the external security environment of the SR**

Radicalized individuals inspired by propaganda of the so-called ISLAMIC STATE and AL-QAIDA Islamists terrorist groups have been the main source of the terrorist threat to Europe in 2021. The preferred modus operandi consisted of small-scale attacks with minimal level of organisation perpetrated by radicalized individuals using easily available cold weapons. No suicide attacks or terrorism attacks involving firearms have been recorded in 2021 in Europe. An upwards trend of attacks perpetrated by persons with mental health issues, among them

especially by migrants from conflict zones, has been observed.

The MI continued to actively monitor activities and current capabilities of the so-called ISLAMIC STATE and AL QAIDA, including their affiliates, in conflict zones across the Middle East, in Afghanistan, the Sahel region and on the African continent. Special attention was paid to deployment areas of the AF SR members or units and to the possibility of terrorist attacks being perpetrated within the territory of the SR. In the assessed period, no direct threats of attacks against members or units of the AF SR deployed to conflict zones by Islamist terrorist groups have been identified.

## **Political and religious extremism affecting the performance of the AF SR and extremism in the ranks of professional soldiers**

The MI continued to collect and analyse information related to extremist and paramilitary groups as well as to natural and legal persons supporting any extremist, radical, paramilitary or separatist groups with any form of ties or other links to the defence sector. Aspects associated to RWE and the closely related anti-system issue have been considered the most serious threat.

Boundaries of what is considered widely acceptable conduct and views have been pushed further in 2021, while radicalisation and polarisation of the society has further increased. Growing support especially towards the anti-system has been observed amongst parts of the population. This negative development has highly likely resulted from anti-government sentiment largely caused by the implementation of anti-pandemic measures to curb COVID-19, growing mistrust amongst citizens not only towards authorities and institutions, but also towards each other and, last but not least, the mass spread of disinformation and hoaxes in the absence of strategic communication by state institutions and public authorities.

The phenomena described above coupled with polarisation and radicalisation have aided the growth of extremism and increase in support

for undemocratic and authoritarian ideologies. When looking at the spread of RWE and growth of the radical anti-system, the highest risk stems from a translation of feelings of discontent and frustration amongst citizens expressed mainly online into acts of aggression and violence committed in real life. This development is even more worrisome, when considering that some members of the AF SR have been in favour or even participated in this kind of behaviour.

During 2021, activities of harmful sectarian groups did not pose a security threat to tasks fulfilled by the defence sector.

### **Anti-vaccinationism linked to COVID-19**

The attitude within the AF SR closely matches societal trends and sentiment, with the result that also a small part of the AF SR members has openly promoted various anti-system narratives during the assessed period. The recorded instances involved stating doubts about and refusal to undergo testing, the refusal to wear masks or to be vaccinated and the active dissemination of conspiracy theories and disinformation within the AF SR and the resulting individual instances of disobeying orders given by superiors.

The opposition to vaccination against COVID-19 amongst members of the AF SR has rendered some units of the AF SR incapable of fulfilling their tasks due to limited staffing, since primarily vaccinated personnel has been deployed to duties, training activities and stand-by service, while unvaccinated personnel has been exempted from such duties. This situation has resulted into discontent and tensions amongst professional soldiers and commanding officers. Overall, these developments have aided the emergence of dividing lines and disturbed the organisational cohesion of different units of the AF SR. Some members of the AF SR refused to be vaccinated and individual members of the AF SR lodged complaints associated with vaccination, this has been the case especially at the end of 2021. These complains were highly likely drafted by informed persons belonging to the anti-system scene.

The case of a member of the AF SR refusing to wear a mask and to participate in the operation JOINT RESPONSIBILITY in 2020 has been the most significant manifestation of an anti-system stance in the ranks of the AF SR. This person has also been in contact with former AF SR members who in November 2021 verbally attacked employees at a grocery store of the Lidl retailer chain in PIESTANY and later physically attacked the arriving police officers.

### RWE in the AF SR

The MI also obtained relevant information about AF SR members tied to the extremist scene and having sympathies for anti-system and anti-democratic ideas. Any sympathies for this kind of ideas are totally inconsistent with the task being fulfilled by the armed and security forces of a democratic country. Therefore, the command of the AF SR resorted to adequate punitive precautionary measures in the above described instances. An identified case of an AF SR

member openly expressing sympathies for RWE has been referred to NAKA of the Presidium of the PF by the MI for further action.

As a consequence of growing content moderation on Facebook, the migration of parts of the Slovak RWE and anti-system scene to other platforms providing persons creating or searching for disturbing or illicit extremist content apparently with more anonymity has been observed in 2021.

These groups are characterised by a large number of different RWE and anti-system narratives that are interlinked to varying degrees. They stand out for an extreme

right-wing orientation, often using themes linked to anti-Semitism and white supremacists. Sometimes, they pick up narratives from conservative US alt-right movements (open racism, accelerationism).

Comments posted within those groups remain for the most part just below the detection threshold of law enforcement agencies with regards to criminal offences such as extremism or violence threat, since they are made indirectly by using symbolism requiring careful classification within the context of the neo-Nazi subculture. Other identified communities have been focused on spreading disinformation and conspiracy theories. Persons, who identify as members of the AF SR, are present among users in both types of the above described communities. User posts usually contain extreme violence, cyber-bullying and doxing.

### Slovak Conscripts

The MI also continued to monitor activities of long-established paramilitary and militia-like groups. The so-called Slovak Conscripts (Slovenskí branci) remain the most significant paramilitary organisation and include also former members of the AF SR.



During 2021, the organisation continued to endure a gridlock. They have been relying on vital support from various anti-system and extremist actors in order to ensure its functioning. These same circumstances have however at the same time pushed them further away from achieving their long-term objective of becoming a legitimate state-recognised paramilitary organisation.

At the start of 2021, the organisation changed its logo, removing the red diamond-shaped shield with white and red coloured fields reminiscent of the emblem used by the NSDAP-related paramilitary organization of German youth called Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend).

The establishment of international relations with a paramilitary unit from Poland named Jednostka Strzelecka 2077 KRAKOV has been amongst the most significant developments with regards to the long-term orientation of the Slovak Conscripts during the assessed period. Some leading members of the Polish unit are linked to a Polish pro-Russian party called Zmiana and the neo-Nazi Falanga movement. The Polish unit is also tied to a false flag incident from February 2018, when three members of the unit set on fire a Hungarian cultural centre in the Ukrainian city of UZHGOROD. The attack was in line with Russian aims of inciting hatred and intolerance towards national minorities and destabilising the security situation in Ukraine.

## Illegal migration

In 2021, the MI continued to collect information on irregular migration flows to Europe and focused on threats to SR and EU stemming from irregular migratory movements. The 2021 saw an approximately 29.6% increase in the number of irregular migrants reaching Europe compared to 2020. An estimated 118,770 migrants entered Europe via three Mediterranean migration routes. Data regarding arrivals to Cyprus and Malta are not included in the above mentioned number.

The western Mediterranean route (towards Spain) saw a 3% increase in the number of new arrivals in 2021 (altogether 43,197). Significant deviations in the numbers of new arrivals were not detected on the Atlantic route in 2021 (23,042 persons) compared to 2020. The central Mediterranean route (towards Italy) was the most frequently used route to Europe in 2021 and recorded a 95% increase in the number of incoming irregular migrants (66,770 persons).

The number of irregular migrants arriving to Europe via the eastern Mediterranean route (towards Greece) has declined in 2021 by 44% (8,803 persons). The number of new arrivals to Greece has continued to fall for a second year in

row. However, a significantly stronger migratory pressure was recorded in 2021 in Cyprus with a 265% increase in the number of migrants who entered Cyprus via the northern part of the island



using land corridors. An estimated 9,400 migrants crossed into the northern part of Cyprus in 2021 which represents an almost three-fold increase compared to 2020 (2,965).

The significance of the land routes leading towards Bulgaria has been growing in 2021 with a 160% increase in the number of migrants entering this country compared to 2020. With the aim to reach Western Europe countries, irregular migrants have been transiting further through

Hungary and in some cases also through the SR with the assistance of smuggling groups, hiding in lorries or using the railway transport. Irregular migrants attempted to enter the Schengen area also from Ukraine while they transited through the SR or Poland towards Western Europe.

The migrant crisis which unfolded along the eastern EU border with Belarus was the most security-relevant migration-related development in the SR near abroad. Since June 2021, migrants predominantly from Middle East and Africa have started to arrive to Belarus and assisted by the Belarusian security forces made continuous attempts to illegally enter the Schengen area towards Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. As a consequence, these countries adopted protective measures and restrictions along their borders with Belarus. In 2021, Polish security forces thwarted almost 42,000 illegal attempts to enter the country from Belarus. In reaction to the part played by Belarusian authorities in organising this migratory wave, the EU adopted five sanctions packages targeting high-ranking Belarusian

officials and also companies which helped to incite this migration crisis.

In 2021, there was a recorded 36.6% increase in cases of irregular migration in the SR (1,769) compared to 2020 (1,295). The majority of irregular migrants were of Afghan (470) and Moroccan (285) origin. The number of illegal border crossings increased by 55, 6% from 135 in 2020 to 210 in 2021. The majority of migrants illegally crossing the state border to the SR from Ukraine were of Pakistan nationality (31).

Within the assessed period, the MI also collected and analysed information regarding individuals and groups involved in the process of transferring illegal migrants into the SR, with a special focus on cases of pseudo-legal migration. Within the Iranian community, in particular, illegal trading of residence permits obtained for the purpose of establishing business was detected. Among Iranians who attempted to illegally obtain a residence permit in the SR were also persons who could pose a threat related to terrorism.



## **ORGANISED CRIME AND CRIME AGAINST THE DEFENCE OF THE SR AND ILLEGAL TRADE IN DEFENCE INDUSTRY PRODUCTS**

### **Organised crime against the defence of the SR**

One of the priorities and long-term tasks of the MI remains the detection of acts related to illicit armaments, illicit arms and ammunition trade, drug-related crime committed by members of the AF SR as well as corrupt behaviour of defence sector employees and AF SR members and cross-border crime.

The MI obtained information related to illicit armaments and illicit arms trade committed by individual members of the AF SR. One of the cases concerned the reengagement of an AF SR member in offering blank firing firearms for sale, while the offer included their full restoration to a firing condition. The MI has successfully identified the persons responsible for restoring the operability of these firearms. Another case involved an offering to sell up to 4,000 pieces of ammunition packed in original boxes but with removed serial numbers.

During the assessed period, the MI also obtained information regarding attempts aimed at selling defence industry products highly likely coming from inside the AF SR. The case has been referred to the Military Police for further action.

In the field of the fight against drug-related crimes within the defence sector, the MI obtained relevant information concerning the involvement of one member of the AF SR in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, toxic substances and precursors, their possession and traffic as well as regarding the consumption and distribution of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and anabolic steroids by other members of the AF SR.

The MI has also identified several instances linked to violations of internal regulations and of the code of conduct as well as to other forms of misconduct amongst members of the AF SR. Attention has been paid to these cases in order to tackle any emerging or already existing antisocial activity as far as possible at source before its escalation.

In the field of the fight against cross-border crime linked to smuggling of irregular migrants, the MI identified foreigners residing in the SR as the persons principally responsible for organising the smuggling. The findings are indicative of a particularly sophisticated and elaborate form of smuggling focused on irregular migrants who could not reach their desired destination country, were intercepted by Slovak authorities and placed into reception centres for foreigners or entered SR illegally without the knowledge of relevant authorities. The obtained information has been referred to the Bureau of Border and Foreign Police of the Presidium of the PF and resulted into the launch of successful criminal proceedings. The MI has also successfully identified an organised group engaged in transporting contraband largely from Ukraine through the territory of the SR. Relevant information has been referred to the Financial Administration Criminal Office and the Presidium of the PF for further action.



## Illicit trade in defence-related products

The security environment of the SR is also significantly affected by trade in defence industry products as well as deactivated or modified weapons. Traders and brokers of defence industry products, weapon systems and weapons

an eye to their possible use by militant, rebel, terrorist or jihadists groups or by radicalised individuals. A special attention was paid to applications indicating potential re-export risks to countries involved in any ongoing armed conflicts or suspected of breaching basic human rights and privileges.

chlorine

During the evaluation period, the MI identified several persons and companies in possession of all the necessary authorisations from competent authorities whose behaviour, however, indicated the presence of a new ‘modus operandi’. This behaviour was based on the fact that only low-risk transactions with reliable foreign trading partners were being submitted for authorisation to relevant Slovak authorities, while higher-risk transactions were usually signed by affiliated companies located outside the EU. By doing so, the persons and companies likely also manage to evade international restriction concerning the transfer of defence-related products. Most of the financial transactions are officially carried out by foreign companies. However, a clear connection with their Slovak owners can be observed. Due to the above-mentioned modus operandi, such transactions do not undergo the evaluation process by the Ministry of Economy of the SR and the state authorities are not being informed about the transactions.

Concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery means and related technologies, the MI cooperated with other national authorities, partner services and international organisations in order to evaluate the possibility of their potential use by state or non-state actors. The focus was aimed mainly at the Vienna talks between the representatives of Iran, the United States and the remaining signatories of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.



perceive the SR as a safe country, suitable for the preparation and subsequent implementation of trades involving the sale of weapons and weapon systems worldwide, including to regions with a disturbed security landscape.

Within the Permanent Expert Group of the Ministry of Economy of the SR, the MI participated in the export control system of defence-related products, including firearms, ammunition and dual-use products. In 2021, a total of approximately 1,200 trade licence applications and another 33 applications for authorization to trade defence-related products (5 years validity) were submitted by Slovak companies and subsequently verified by the competent authorities. Concerning the trade in other specified products and dual-use items, more than 670 applications from authorised Slovak trading companies and defence-related products manufacturers were assessed.

When evaluating licence applications, the nature of the defence-related products and the final destination of export were taken into account (e.g. Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Sudan), with



The cyberspace as a domain of operations requires close and coordinated national and international cooperation in order to ensure its security. Within the framework of NATO, the MI has a permanent representation in the relevant political and technical committees. The SR also belongs to the founding states of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in TALLIN. At multilateral level, close cooperation within the Visegrad Group (hereafter as “V4”) plays a vital role. In 2021, the initial cyber staff directors meeting took place. In 2022, the meeting will be hosted by the Centre as a part of the Slovak V4 presidency. At bilateral level, the MI closely cooperates with selected

NATO and EU countries in order to strengthen the cyber defence by way of information exchange on recorded cyber incidents.

During the evaluated period, the Centre participated in several NATO and EU-organised cyber security and cyber defence training activities. Among the most prominent were the LOCKED SHIELD 2021, CROSSED SWORDS 2021, CYBER COALITION 2021 exercises as well as so-called tabletop exercises taking place as part of the EU MilCERT Interoperability Conference organised by the European Defence Agency.



## PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND SECURITY VETTING

The protection of classified information (hereafter as “PCI”) within the authority of the MoD is provided by the MI in accordance and within the scope of Act No. 198/1994 Coll. on MI and Act No. 215/2004 Coll. on PCI and its implementing rules.


In 2021, inspection activities in the area of the PCI were carried out in six entities falling under the MoD and the findings related to the following areas: personnel, physical, facility, and administrative security. There were two suspected violations of PCI and other findings that were forwarded to the relevant administrative authorities for further proceedings.

The MI also participated in several modernisation projects carried out by the MoD, which involved also the handling of classified information manipulation and the exchange of

drafted a total of 67 legislative proposals in order to amend Act No. 215/2004 Coll. on PCI and its implementing rules, taking into account the needs and specificities of the MoD and the AF SR.

In the area of personnel security, the MI received 3,830 applications for security clearances in 2021. Out of this number, 1,773 security clearances resulted into the drafting of statements for the NSA, in 14 instances proposals for issuing a decision were elaborated and in 38 instances the security clearance process was suspended in accordance with the law. In the process of security vetting, there were more than 58,500 requests sent out by the MI to other governmental institutions, local authorities and legal persons. A total of 34,000 administrative and registration operations were carried out during the process of issuing NATO and EU clearance certificates.

**Overview of Inspection Activities by Areas in 2021**



classified information with allied security services. Concerning the implementation of the Government Policy Statement of the SR, the MI

Concerning industrial security, the MI drew up expertise on 22 contracts and further 43 contract addendums concerning classified information sharing. The MI also participated in the entrepreneurial security screening process by providing 171 written statements on security vetting applications in accordance with Act No. 215/2004. In relation to the provision of information on security reliability of proposed persons, the MI processed a total of 4,814 requests and statements.

## USE OF INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL MEANS

In 2021, the MI used information and technical means (hereafter as "ITM") in accordance with provisions of Act No. 166/2003 Coll. on protection of privacy against unauthorised use of ITM and amendments to certain laws (hereafter as "Protection against Eavesdropping Act"), as last amended, and Act No. 198/1994, while each use of ITM was in accordance with Section 4 of the Protection against Eavesdropping Act and based on prior written consent of a lawful judge. There was no unauthorized use of ITM in either cases.

The MI submitted a total of 44 requests for the use of ITM in 2021, while all requests for consent were approved by a lawful judge. 29 extension requests were submitted for ITM use and all of them were granted judicial approval. The purpose and objective of ITM use as required by law were met in 34 concluded authorized cases in 2021 and in 1 concluded authorized case the purpose and objective of ITM use as required by law was not met.

## IMINT CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENTS

By successfully implementing professional and staffing measures and gaining access to relevant source data the MI successfully concluded its IMINT' (Imagery Intelligence) capability development phase and acquired full operational capabilities in 2020. In 2021, the MI continued to further develop its capabilities by creating a GEOINT' (Geospatial Intelligence) element, which acquired initial operational capabilities.

In the reporting period, the MI continued with the provision of IMINT' reports to decision makers of the MoD and other authorized users, which significantly contributed to the threat and security situation assessment in the geographic

areas of intelligence responsibility and intelligence interest.

In the context of growing tensions at the Russian-Ukrainian border in April 2021 and at the end of 2021, the MI provided IMINT' analyses on a regular basis as part of comprehensive products assessing the security situation in the region, whereby IMINT' and GEOINT' products contributed significantly to the timely assessment of indicators of the deteriorating security situation. IMINT' analyses also significantly contributed to the assessment of the migration crisis on the border of Poland with Belarus in the summer of 2021. The IMINT' reports were also highly appreciated within the intelligence community of NATO and the EU.

## INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE

There was high demand for swift and efficient countermeasures to be taken by the MI due to the dynamic development of the global security environment coupled with new threats and the COVID-19 pandemic. The timely sharing of relevant updated intelligence information with foreign counterparts is an integral and increasingly important part of international cooperation in today's complex security environment.

The prompt and flexible adjustment of MI officers to a new and rapidly changing environment was key to ensure the timely and effective exchange of intelligence between partner states.

In 2021, the MI continued to follow the established trend of active cooperation on bilateral and multilateral level and its further development, carried out either through the


established video-conferencing or face-to-face meeting. The MI also actively participated in activities at NATO and EU level, in accordance with the obligations arising from the MI membership in these organizations.

In 2021, the MI processed and provided 862 intelligence products to authorized users and contracted entities. Of these, 265 were intelligence reports and 597 exchange intelligence products for foreign intelligence partners. There was a 37% increase in intelligence production in 2021 compared to 2020.


The cooperation with partners has a substantial effect on expanding the information databases of the MI, especially in the fields of assessing global and regional security, terrorism, cyber threats, as well as, foreign intelligence services.

In 2021, particular attention was paid to assessing the escalation of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which escalated into a crisis at the end of the year, the sudden change of power in Afghanistan and the migration crisis on the border of Poland with Belarus as well. The MI also paid special attention to activities related to international terrorism groups that may pose a threat to protected values and interests of the SR, EU and NATO member states as well as to the growing threat of radicalisation in vulnerable populations due to the spread of radical Islamism.

**Intelligence Production – Territorial Focus 2021**



**Intelligence Production – Thematic Focus 2021**



## HUMAN RESOURCES

As of 31 December 2021, the staffing level stood at 65.11% out of the planned staff structure. This figure represents a decrease in the number of personnel by 0.52% compared to 2020. The average age of the MI personnel was


43 years. The staff structure, as defined by standard demographics, remains unchanged compared to the previous year.

76% of the MI employees are professional soldiers and 24% are public service employees, of

which 76% were male and 24% were female. The higher education attainment rate (including first level higher education) among the MI personnel stands at 70%.

There were several hundred job applications submitted to the MI consisting of admissions into the state service of professional soldiers, temporary assignment for the fulfilment of tasks of the MI and public service employment applications in 2021. Nearly 45% more such applications have been submitted compared to 2020. Admission rates were as follows: 23% successful admissions, 34% unsuccessful admissions and 43% of the applications are still pending. The average time from the inclusion of an applicant in the recruitment process to the recruitment of a staff member was 362 days.

Age Structure (in %)



## BUDGET

The budget administrator of the MoD chapter set the bidding indicators for the MI for 2021 in the area of revenues to the amount of EUR 85,200 and in the area of expenditures to the amount of EUR 96,933,375.

The allocated expenditure budget as of January 1, 2021, was 8.93% lower compared to 2020 (EUR 105,591,951).

During the year 2021, the binding indicator in the area of expenditures was decreased by EUR 5,038,268 representing a 5.2% reduction, to the total amount of EUR 91,895,107.

The reduction in the budget limit was made so that the balance of the financial resources would

provide for mandatory expenditure on staff and the contractual expenditure on goods and services. Planned investment actions under capital expenditures were not implemented. There was a decrease of more than 19.5% compared to year 2020 in capital expenditures.

As of December 31, 2021, the expenditure budget consumption of the MI as defined by economic budget classification was by EUR 86,793,752.09 in the main budget category 600 – Current Expenditure and by EUR 5,101,043.84 in the main budget category 700 – Capital Expenditure.



## CONCLUSION

The activity of the MI in 2021 continued to be influenced by the development of the COVID-19 pandemic in the SR and in the world. At the same time, in the external security environment, the trend of growing tension and promotion of a multipolar world continued. Several key regional and global security actors have pursued their own approaches to addressing global, regional and national issues and interests, while processes like the continued weakening of international institutions and organisations, including questioning of their importance, as well as non-compliance with international law, weakening of cooperative security mechanisms and non-compliance with contractual frameworks of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have continued with a detrimental effect on the current security architecture.

The escalation of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the sudden change of power in Afghanistan and the migration crisis on the border of Poland with Belarus were the most significant events in 2021 in the external security environment of the SR. The trend of using coercive military power by Russia in pursuing its geopolitical goals was noted.

The build-up of combat potential of modern and technologically advanced conventional AF of key actors was also focused on the development of cyber capabilities and the development and production of autonomous weapon systems.

Due to the existing geopolitical dynamics, as well as internal social polarisation, it is possible to assume that also 2022 will be marked by a high intensity of activities of foreign intelligence services.

In the cyber domain, state and non-state actors will likely be offered a number of opportunities to easily gain political, economic and military advantages on strategic, operational as well as tactical level by the dynamic development of the information and communication technologies also in 2022.

With the transition of the media landscape into the cyber domain the cyberspace has become the stage of geopolitical competition among key actors enabling them to conduct extensive and sophisticated information operations aimed at pursuing their national interests. Wide-ranging tools and subliminal forms are employed through information networks, especially information and psychological influence activities and so-called influence operations conducted as part of hybrid warfare against populations in order to divide societies and weaken the legitimacy of state institutions.

This trend was noted also in the SR and will highly likely continue also in the future, since key actors see influence operations as an effective tool. Both polarisation and the drawing of dividing lines thus contribute to more radicalisation in the society. This creates fertile ground for extremism to reach all spheres of society, including AF SR members and defence sector employees.

Ongoing conflicts, the poor socio-economic situation of the population and climate changes in the crisis regions of Africa, the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia will be significant factors driving migration waves to Europe, including the SR.

The continued dissemination of Islamist terrorist groups' propaganda coupled with measures against the spread of COVID-19, has led to self-radicalization of individuals in the online space and act as a catalyst for the formation of so-called lone wolves, which can be used for a terrorist attack.

Developments in Afghanistan and security threats associated with the possible infiltration of persons with a terrorist background among refugees may negatively affect the terrorism threat level across Europe, including the SR, in 2022.

All the tasks of the MI, as defined in Act No. 198/1994 Coll. on MI, and stipulated in the Intelligence Objectives of the MI for 2021, were completed, which created good preconditions for the activities and further development of the MI's capabilities in the coming period.

